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ABSTRACT 
This article is the first major study of protection and valuation 
of trade secrets under federal criminal law.  Trade secrecy is more 
important than ever as an economic complement and substitute for 
other intellectual property protections, particularly patents.  
Accordingly, U.S. public policy correctly places a growing 
emphasis on characterizing the scope of trade secrets, creating 
incentives for their productive use, and imposing penalties for their 
theft.  Yet amid this complex ecosystem of legal doctrine, economic 
policy, commercial strategy, and enforcement, there is little 
research or consensus on how to assign value to trade secrets.  One 
reason for this gap is that intangible assets in general are 
notoriously difficult to value, and trade secrecy by its opaque 
nature is ill-suited to the market-signaling mechanisms that offer at 
least some traction in other forms of valuation.  Another reason is 
that criminal trade secret law is relatively young, and the usual 
corrective approaches to valuation in civil trade secrecy are not 
synonymous with the greater distributive concerns of criminal law.  
To begin to fill this gap, we examine over a decade of trade secret 
protection and valuation under the U.S. Economic Espionage Act 
of 1996.  From original data on EEA prosecutions, we show that 
trade secret valuations are lognormally distributed as predicted by 
Gibrat’s Law, with valuations typically low on the order of $5 
million but reaching as high as $250 million.  There is no notable 
difference among estimates from various valuation methods, but a 
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difference between high and low estimates on one hand and the 
sentencing estimates on the other.  These findings suggest that the 
EEA has not been used to its full capacity, a conclusion buttressed 
by recent Congressional actions to strengthen the EEA. 
118 WHAT’S IT WORTH TO KEEP A SECRET? [Vol. 13 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 119 
I. THE CONTOURS OF TRADE SECRECY ................................................ 121 
A. The Legal Dimension ................................................................... 121 
1. Trade Secrecy as Intellectual Property ...................................... 121 
2. Trade Secrecy and Employment ............................................... 124 
B. The Economic Dimension ............................................................ 128 
C. The Economic Espionage Act of 1996 ......................................... 131 
II. PROSECUTIONS UNDER THE EEA ..................................................... 135 
A. Data and Descriptive Statistics .................................................... 135 
B. Econometric Model ...................................................................... 136 
C. Valuation Models ......................................................................... 137 
1. Income Models ......................................................................... 137 
2. Cost Models .............................................................................. 139 
3. Market Models .......................................................................... 140 
III. DISCUSSION ..................................................................................... 140 
A. Estimates Across Valuation Models ............................................ 140 
B. Distribution and Comparison of Trade Secret Values .................. 142 
C. Differences in Estimation ............................................................. 142 
1. Low and High Estimates ........................................................... 142 
2. Cross-Reference Values ............................................................ 144 
D. Implications of Valuation Differences ......................................... 146 
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................... 147 
TABLES AND FIGURES ........................................................................... 149 
 
No. 1] DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 119  
INTRODUCTION 
Trade secrets are tremendously important . . . probably.  Early in 
2013, the Office of the U.S. Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator 
issued an administration-wide strategy to combat the theft of trade secrets.
1
  
The strategy echoed a commitment to protect American intellectual 
property aggressively, a goal which President Obama had set nearly three 
years earlier in a speech before the Export-Import Bank
2
 and which 
presidents of both parties have increasingly articulated in recent times.
3
  In 
mid-2012, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) sent its 
first chief economist to testify before the House Homeland Security 
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence about the threat that 
economic espionage poses for U.S. economic security.
4
  It was clear that the 
Subcommittee appreciated the complex interrelationship among intellectual 
property policy, economic analysis, border security, and law enforcement in 
protecting commercial secrets, for the slate of witnesses also included an 
assistant agency director for investigations from Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement and an assistant agency director from the FBI’s 
counterintelligence division.
5
  For its part, Congress, in the landmark 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011, expanded the ability of prior 
                                                     
1
 WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF THE IP ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR, Strategy on 
Mitigating the Theft of U.S. Trade Secrets (Feb. 2013), available at 
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/IPEC/admin_strategy_on_mitigating_t
he_theft_of_u.s._trade_secrets.pdf. 
2
 WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, Remarks by the President at the 
Export-Import Bank’s Annual Conference (Mar. 11, 2010), available at 
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-export-import-banks-
annual-conference. 
3
 E.g., Remarks by President George W. Bush at a Welcoming Ceremony for 
President Hu Jintao of China (Apr. 20, 2006), available at 
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-2006-04-24/html/WCPD-2006-04-24-Pg740.htm 
(calling for China, inter alia, “to improve enforcement of intellectual property 
rights”); Remarks of President William J. Clinton at the World Trade Organization 
in Geneva Switzerland (May 18, 1998), available at www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-
1998-book1/html/PPP-1998-book1-doc-pg807-2.htm (describing a joint U.S.-Japan 
commitment to “protect intellectual property” and, further, calling for broader 
consensus within the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation). 
4
 House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, 
Economic Espionage: A Foreign Intelligence Threat to American Jobs and 
Homeland Security, Hearing (June 28, 2012) (statement of USPTO Chief 
Economist Stuart J.H. Graham). 
5
 House Homeland Security Subcommittee Counterterrorism and Intelligence, 
Economic Espionage: A Foreign Intelligence Threat to American Jobs and 
Homeland Security, Hearing, (June 28, 2012), available at 
www.homeland.house.gov/hearing/subcommittee-hearing-economic-espionage-
foreign-intelligence-threat-american-jobs-and. 
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users of a secret product or process to defend against allegations of 
infringement under a later-issued patent on the given product or process.
6
  
In a separate provision of the same law, Congress also directed the USPTO 
to publish a report by January 2012 on how the protection of trade secrets 
through a prior user defense operates in the industrialized world.
7
 
The reason the importance of trade secrets is in question, despite 
such strong institutional indicia, reflects the titular question of this article: 
far from being an academic or qualitative inquiry, the importance of trade 
secrets poses a quantitative challenge to estimate just how important, how 
valuable, how worth protecting they are.  To help answer that question, this 
article offers a comprehensive study assessing the value of trade secrets 
based on original data from federal criminal prosecutions for trade secret 
misappropriation.  Of particular interest are differences between the trade 
secret values estimated under various economic methods and the set of 
values actually employed in sentencing. 
This article contains three parts.  Part I summarizes the law and 
economics of trade secrecy and introduces the Economic Espionage Act of 
1996.  Part II presents an empirical study of criminal trade secret 
prosecutions, describing the econometric specification and data from the 
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), the Public Access to Court Electronic 
Records service, and other sources.  Part III discusses the study’s findings 
as well as their normative implications.  First in this discussion is a 
descriptive view of U.S. federal criminal protection of trade secrecy, based 
on comparative estimates of trade secret value.  Second is an assessment of 
key models for calculating damages and, accordingly, of how best to value 
trade secrets.  Third is further statistical and econometric analysis of 
differences between high and low trade secret value estimates and cross-
reference values.  Fourth is a discussion of the criminal sentencing 
implications that follow from the multiplicity of possible trade secret 
valuations.  The article concludes with an outlook for further research. 
                                                     
6
 Pub. L. No. 112–29 § 5 (Sept. 16, 2011), amending 35 U.S.C. § 273.  The prior 
user defense had previously applied only to business methods and strategies.  In 
1998, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held in State Street Bank & Trust 
Co. v. Signature Financial Group Inc. that methods for doing business are patent-
eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.  See 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 
1998).  Congress responded the following year in the American Inventors 
Protection Act by creating a safe harbor for firms whose business methods and 
strategies could now be the subject of patents asserted against them.  Pub. L. No. 
106–113, § 4302 (Nov. 29, 1999). 
7
 USPTO, REPORT ON THE PRIOR USER RIGHTS DEFENSE (Jan. 2012), available at 
www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/20120113-pur_report.pdf. 
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I. THE CONTOURS OF TRADE SECRECY 
Protecting trade secrets and penalizing their misappropriation has 
long been a part of commercial strategy.
8
  It was in the nineteenth century, 
however, that Anglo-American common law formally recognized trade 
secrets as protectable interests.
9
  Moreover, only in modern economic 
strategy have trade secrets emerged as a major mechanism for guarding the 
value of intangible assets.
10
  Particularly in recent years, trade secrecy has 
risen in importance as a potentially attractive alternative in the face of 
dissatisfaction with aspects of the U.S. patent system,
11
 including arguments 
that various characteristics of the current patent system can actively impede 
innovation.
12
  As a result, a growing literature on appropriating value from 
knowledge assets now describes the value of trade secrecy relative to other 
mechanisms.
13
  This literature has two dimensions: legal and economic. 
A. The Legal Dimension 
1. Trade Secrecy as Intellectual Property 
As a legal matter, a trade secret is any information that is the 
subject of reasonable efforts to keep it secret and which derives independent 
economic value from the maintenance of its secrecy from others who can 
benefit economically from its disclosure—be it a “formula, pattern, 
compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process.”14  Having no 
formal registration requirement, trade secrecy originally arose state by state 
                                                     
8
 See generally Stephan R. Epstein, Craft Guilds, Apprenticeship, and 
Technological Change in Preindustrial Europe, 58 J. ECON. HIST. 684 (1998). 
9
 Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets As IP Rights, 
61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 315 (citing Vickery v. Welch, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 523 
(1837), and Newbery v. James, (1817) 35 Eng. Rep. 1011 (Ch.)). 
10
 See, e.g., Josh Lerner, The Importance of Trade Secrecy: Evidence from Civil 
Litigation, Harv. Bus. Sch. Working Paper No. 95-043 (Dec. 1994). 
11
 See, e.g., ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: 
HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, 
AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2004). 
12
 DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS 
CAN SOLVE IT (2009). 
13
 See generally Wesley M. Cohen, Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, Protecting 
Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why US Manufacturing 
Firms Patent (Or Not), NBER Working Paper No. 7552 (Feb. 2000). 
14
 Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(4) (providing a definition for “trade secret”).  In a 
similar vein, the Restatement defines a trade secret as “any information that can be 
used in the operation of a business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently 
valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic advantage over 
others.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995). 
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as a common law right.
15
  However, since the Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
was completed in 1979, that model code has been widely adopted in 47 
states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
16
  
The modern trend toward interstate uniformity without outright 
federalization
17
 has also produced a robust practitioner-oriented literature on 
a variety of subsidiary issues, such as regulatory compliance under the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act
18
 in accounting practices for trade secret assets,
19
 trends 
in federal civil trade secret litigation,
20
 criminal prosecution,
21
 and criminal 
sentencing.
22
 
For all its practical importance, however, trade secrecy has often 
been regarded as a doctrinal aberration in an intellectual property discourse 
that is occupied primarily by patents, trademarks, and copyrights.
23
  Though 
these canonical forms of intellectual property are the subjects of their own 
                                                     
15
 Mary Witzel, Protecting Pharmaceutical Trade Secrets Under the New 
Regulatory Sharing Program, 41 AIPLA Q.J. 737, 742 (2013). 
16
 NAT’L CONF. OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, “Uniform Law 
Commission Legislative Fact Sheet – Trade Secrets Act,” available at 
www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Trade%20Secrets%20Act. 
17
 The latest efforts to create a federal civil cause of action against misappropriation 
of a trade secret include the Future of American Innovation (FAIR) Act of 2013, S. 
1770, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013); The Private Right of Action Against Theft of 
Trade Secrets Act of 2013, H.R. 2466, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013); and the 
Protecting American Trade Secrets and Innovation Act of 2012, S. 3389, 112th 
Cong. (2d Sess. 2012). 
18
 Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (July 30, 
2002). 
19
 See, e.g., R. Mark Halligan, Duty to Identify, Protect Trade Secrets Has Arisen: 
Sarbanes-Oxley Requires Internal Control Over How They Are Valued, NAT’L LAW 
J., Aug. 29, 2005, at S3. 
20
 David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in 
Federal Courts, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 291 (2009). 
21
 Mark L. Krotoski, Common Issues and Challenges in Protecting Trade Secret 
and Economic Espionage Act Cases, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ BULLETIN: 
ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE & TRADE SECRETS, Nov. 2009, at 2, available at 
www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usab5705.pdf. 
22
 Christopher S. Merriam, Addressing Sentencing Issues in Trade Secret and 
Economic Espionage Cases, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ BULLETIN: ECONOMIC 
ESPIONAGE & TRADE SECRETS, Nov. 2009, at 62, available at www.justice.gov/ 
usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usab5705.pdf. 
23
 See R. Mark Halligan, Protecting U.S. Trade Secret Assets in the 21st Century, 6 
No. 1 LANDSLIDE 12, 13 (2013) (noting that “[t]rade secrets have always been 
viewed as a stepchild intellectual property right”); Michael P. Simpson, The Future 
of Innovation, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1122–25 (2005) (identifying and 
criticizing an historical progression of trade secret theory toward a grounding in 
intellectual property as distinguished from “traditional” subjects of intellectual 
property rights, including patents and copyrights). 
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debates as to purpose and form, they are all widely understood as sharing 
certain essential features.  For example, all three are generally utilitarian 
incentive systems.
24
  Moreover, all three draw their force from federal 
organic statutes
25
 and elaborate regulatory regimes in order to provide a 
mechanism for excludably recouping investments in nonrival knowledge 
assets.
26
  For the state-based law of trade secrecy, on the other hand, 
commentators have variously proposed doctrinal frameworks based in tort,
27
 
contract,
28
 and traditional property
29—while expressing doubt as to the 
conception of trade secrecy as intellectual property proper.
30
  Nevertheless, 
there is now also a growing body of literature to support an intellectual 
property-based theory of trade secrecy.
31
 
This literature is both normative and descriptive in its reach.  For 
example, Professor Mark Lemley identifies the key components of such a 
framework with the incentives to invent and to disclose, and with protection 
                                                     
24
 See, e.g., Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, “Patents and Human Rights: Where is the 
Paradox?” in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A PARADOX 74 
(Willem Grosheide, ed.) (2010) (characterizing the traditional conception of 
intellectual property as a utilitarian mechanism for impeding free riders in order to 
foster innovation).  But see Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, Intellectual Property’s 
Negative Space: Beyond the Utilitarian, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 441, 456–57 (2013) 
(defining and defending intellectual property under personality theory as a means 
for exercising “a fundamental right to oneself” inasmuch as the products of one’s 
creative labor are “a manifestation of that self”); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of 
Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 330–65 (1988) (discussing more generally 
the personhood theory of intellectual property law). 
25
 The federal patent laws are codified in Title 35 of the U.S. Code, the federal 
trademark laws in Title 15, and the federal copyright laws in Title 17. 
26
 Economic theory has long recognized that knowledge has two important traits 
that make it difficult to create and easy to copy: first, it is non-rival, or capable of 
being used at the same time by infinitely many people without depriving any one of 
its use; second, it is not excludable, i.e., pragmatically difficult to deny to 
unintended parties.  See, e.g., Paul M. Romer, Endogenous Technological Change, 
98 J. POL. ECON. S71, S74 (1990), available at pages.stern.nyu.edu/~promer/ 
Endogenous.pdf. 
27
 See, e.g., C. Owen Paepke, An Economic Interpretation of the Misappropriation 
Doctrine: Common Law Protection for Investments in Innovation, 2 HIGH TECH. 
L.J. 55 (1987). 
28
 See, e.g., Thornton Robison, The Confidence Game: An Approach to the Law 
About Trade Secrets, 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 347 (1983). 
29
 See, e.g., Miguel Deutch, The Property Concept of Trade Secrets in Anglo-
American Law: An Ongoing Debate, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 313 (1997). 
30
 Edmund W. Kitch, Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 683 (1980). 
31
 See, e.g., Charles Tait Graves, Trade Secrets as Property: Theory and 
Consequences, 15 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 39 (2007). 
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channels between patents and trade secrets.
32
  Secrecy requirements in trade 
secret law provide what Lemley terms a gatekeeper function.  Under this 
view, trade secrecy is not a pragmatic means of appropriating the value of 
inherently self-disclosing products, as those products have low or no 
excludability.
33
  Thus, secrecy requirements raise the cost of secrecy to 
encourage disclosure of information that would otherwise remain secret 
while channeling to the patent system those self-disclosing inventions for 
which secrecy is futile.
34
  Similarly drawing on intellectual property 
rationales but proposing a principled preference in favor of secrecy where 
circumstances warrant, Professor Jonas Anderson argues from patent 
reward theory that facilitating choice by the inventor of the proper 
protection regime—whether patent or trade secret—is the most efficient 
solution to the problem of free riding.
35
 
2. Trade Secrecy and Employment 
Closely related to these mechanisms of trade secret protection are 
the interactions through which parties exchange and potentially expose 
trade secret assets, particularly interactions between employers and 
employees.  Early American trade secret law took it as virtually axiomatic 
that “when a party who has a secret in trade employs persons [subject to 
secrecy,] those persons cannot gain the knowledge of the secret and then set 
it up against their employer.”36  This protection of company knowledge 
through a duty of confidentiality has survived well into modern case law as 
well.  For example, in Metallurgical Industries v. Fourtek, the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found in favor of an industrial zinc-recovery 
furnace manufacturer whose former employees had set up a competing firm 
using proprietary metal reclamation processes.
37
  In fact, the court went 
further, imposing liability not only on the former employees but also on 
                                                     
32
 See Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP 
Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311 (2009). 
33
 Professor Lemley’s discussion draws on the distinction developed by Professor 
Katherine Strandburg between self-disclosing and non-self-disclosing inventions.  
See Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the 
Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 104–18. 
34
 Lemley, supra note 32, at 313. 
35
 See J. Jonas Anderson, Secret Inventions, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 917, 962 
(2011). 
36
 Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 459 (1868) (citing Lord Cranworth’s opinion 
in Morison v. Moat, 9 Hare 241 (1851), regarding the law on “breach of 
confidence”). 
37
 Metallurgical Indus. Inc. v. Fourtek, Inc., 790 F.2d 1195, 1197–98 (5th Cir. 
1998). 
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their third-party client, who had benefited from the employees’ breach of 
confidence.
38
 
However, the protection of trade secrets against a breach of 
confidence has not been without limits, particularly where the owner itself 
has either compromised its secrecy or relinquished it altogether.  For 
example, in Group One v. Hallmark Cards, the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit applying Missouri state law found that a proprietary method 
for producing decorative curled and shredded ribbon was no longer 
protectable as a trade secret once the owner had published it in a patent 
application, even though the alleged misappropriator was not aware of the 
publication.
39
  The Federal Circuit affirmed a “property theory” view of 
trade secrecy that regards the status of the secret as the logical antecedent, 
rather than a “relationship theory” view that would have penalized 
misappropriation based on the expected connection of confidence between 
the owner of the secret and the alleged infringer, such as an employee.
40
 
Moreover, the enthusiasm for protecting trade secrets has, in U.S. 
law, stopped short of a more general preference for covenants not to 
compete.  As the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit explained in the 
early years of the Sherman Antitrust Act, reasonably limited non-compete 
agreements are acceptable as an ancillary provision to generally pro-
competitive ventures such as a sale of a business operation.
41
  Judge Taft, in 
his limited endorsement of non-compete agreements, found reasonable only 
that “the seller should be able to restrain the buyer from doing him an injury 
which, but for the sale, the buyer would be unable to inflict.  This was not 
reducing competition, but was only securing the seller against an increase of 
competition of his own creating.”42  This distinction has important practical 
ramifications for trade secrecy.  For their part, non-disclosure agreements 
offer specific and limited protection for trade secrets.
43
  By contrast, non-
compete agreements directly curb the eventual economic harm that trade 
secret theft inflicts through greater competition using the misappropriated 
                                                     
38
 Id. at 1204 (explaining that “[t]he law imposes liability not only on those who 
wrongfully misappropriate trade secrets by breach of confidence but also, in certain 
situations, on others who might benefit from the breach”). 
39
 Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 254 F.3d 1041, 1051–52 (Fed. Cir. 
2001). 
40
 See id. at 1051. 
41
 United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 280–82 (6th Cir. 1898), 
aff’d, 175 U.S. 211, (1899).  Judge (later Chief Justice) Taft’s acceptance of 
reasonably limited covenants not to compete remains good law.  E.g., Business 
Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 737–38 (1988). 
42
 Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 280–81. 
43
 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (describing the extent of 
the property right in a trade secret as coextensive with the protective acts of the 
owner in guarding against the secret’s disclosure to others). 
126 WHAT’S IT WORTH TO KEEP A SECRET? [Vol. 13 
 
information.
44
  Yet, precisely because of their broader anticompetitive 
potential, these more potent non-compete agreements are generally suspect 
in U.S. law.
45
  As a result, owners must protect their trade secrets through 
more piecemeal and, ultimately more costly, contractually tailored 
measures. 
Meanwhile, examples abound of high-profile misappropriations, 
particularly in breaches of the employer-employee relationship.  In the 
consulting sector, for example, restructuring advisory firm AlixPartners 
recently accused two of its former managing directors of stealing 
confidential information and trade secrets upon departing to work for 
McKinsey & Company.
46
    AlixPartners also sought to enforce non-
compete agreements against the departing directors.
47
  In high technology, a 
seven-year case spanning much of the 2000s ended in the conviction of two 
                                                     
44
 See Guy Carpenter & Co., Inc. v. Provenzale, 334 F.3d 459, 466.  The court 
explained: 
[I]f an employer gives an employee confidential and proprietary 
information or trade secrets in exchange for the employee’s promise not to 
disclose them, and the parties enter into a covenant not to compete, the 
covenant is ancillary to an otherwise enforceable agreement because: 
(1) the consideration given by the employer [the trade secrets] in the 
otherwise enforceable agreement [exchange of trade secrets for promise 
not to disclose] must give rise to the employer’s interest in restraining the 
employee from competing [employer has interest in restraining employee 
with knowledge of employer’s trade secrets from competing] and 
(2) the covenant must be designed to enforce the employee’s 
consideration or return promise [the promise not to disclose the trade 
secrets] in the otherwise enforceable agreement. 
Id. (quoting Light v. Centel Cellular Co. of Texas, 883 S.W.2d 642, 647 n.14 
(Tex. 1994) (emphasis added). 
45
 See Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Com’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1336 (noting that 
“agreements not to compete that might be suspect standing alone are regarded as 
reasonable when they are ancillary to a larger endeavor whose success they 
promote”) (citing Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 189 
(7th Cir. 1985)) (internal quotations omitted).  See also Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. 
Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 585 F.2d 821, 831 (7th Cir. 1978) (describing a “horizontal 
agreement among potential competitors to develop a national brand and not to 
compete with each other in selling it [as] considerably more suspect than limitations 
imposed by a single independent manufacturer on its distributors as a condition of 
their distributorships”). 
46
 Ashby Jones, AlixPartners Accuses Directors Heading to McKinsey of Trade-
Secret Theft, WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 2014, available at blogs.wsj.com/law/ 
2014/04/10/alixpartners-accuses-directors-heading-to-mckinsey-of-trade-secret-
theft/. 
47
 Complaint at 23–24, AlixPartners v. Thompson, No. 9523 (Ct. Ch. Del. Apr. 9, 
2014), available at assets.law360news.com/0527000/527082/File-Stamped%20 
Complaint.pdf. 
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Silicon Valley engineers for stealing chip design documents from four 
former employers.
48
  In heavy industry, during the late 2000s, metal 
component and assembly manufacturer Metaldyne successfully pursued 
departing employees, including a former vice-president and a metallurgist, 
for trying to sell powdered-metal manufacturing processes to rival 
companies.
49
 
Prominent examples have also come from finance.  In 2009, 
Goldman Sachs alleged that departing programmer Sergey Aleynikov had 
stolen computer code related to the firm’s proprietary high-speed trading 
platform, and that Aleynikov planned to offer similar capabilities to his new 
employer, Teza Technologies.
50
  While Aleynikov’s conviction was 
pending on appeal, French multinational bank Société Générale was 
similarly vindicated in the criminal conviction of former trader Samarth 
Agrawal for stealing the bank’s high-speed trading software, which he had 
planned to replicate for the Manhattan hedge fund Tower Research 
Capital.
51
  The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit later reversed 
Aleynikov’s criminal conviction, holding that computer code could neither 
be a stolen “good” nor be “related to or included in a product that is 
produced for or placed in interstate or foreign commerce” for criminal 
purposes.
52
  A separate decision in the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey went further, directing Goldman Sachs to pay 
Aleynikov’s legal fees.53  Nevertheless, Congress disagreed with these 
judicial conclusions about computer code as an economic good that is 
protectable under federal criminal law.  Congress subsequently reaffirmed 
the importance of trade secrecy to intangible and informational assets such 
as software code and expanded the legal scope of trade secret protection to 
cover such assets via the Theft of Trade Secrets Clarification Act of 2012.
54
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The legislative debate specifically and unfavorably cited the Aleynikov 
reversal as the motivation for the new law.
55
 
B. The Economic Dimension 
Beyond legal doctrine, trade secrecy has likewise benefited in its 
economic dimensions from foundational analytical work by Professors 
Friedman and Landes and Judge Posner.
56
  Further theoretical refinements 
to this work have addressed issues such as strategic delay, the dynamics of 
trade secret accumulation, the relationship of invention scale and the 
strength of property rights to the desirability of trade secrecy, the value of 
trade secret licensing relative to other forms of protection, the treatment of 
trade secrets in collaborative research and development relationships, and 
the impact of trade secrecy upon improvement in research and development 
performance.  
Strategic delay, for example, may be modeled as a decision on the 
part of basic innovators not to patent their innovations—or, more precisely, 
not to develop their innovations for patentability—immediately.57  An 
innovator firm often has an incentive to opt out of the patent system initially 
and proceed using trade secrecy in developing applications of its knowledge 
assets because of the relative immediacy with which rival firms may reverse 
engineer publicly introduced applications of the innovation or infer the 
innovation from the published patent application.
58
  However, the nature of 
the incentive to delay rests on competing effects.  A larger number of rival 
firms in the market tends to diffuse the innovation more quickly, which then 
influences the innovator firm to wait and appropriate more applications of 
its innovation and to share fewer remaining applications with rival firms.
59
  
At the same time, delay by the innovator firm also delays its own payoff 
with regard to already-developed applications.
60
  The resulting 
maximization problem has a unique positive solution, meaning that the 
innovator firm will choose to delay introducing its applications by an 
optimal time and reap optimal discounted profits.
61
 
Within the firm, optimal accumulation of trade secret assets may be 
a function both of investment in the protection of the firm’s trade secrets 
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 158 Cong. Rec. S6968 (daily ed. Nov. 27, 2012). 
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 See generally David D. Friedman, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, 
Some Economics of Trade Secret Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 61 (1991). 
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 Carmen Matutes, Pierre Regibeau & Katherine E. Rockett, Optimal Patent 
Design and the Diffusion of Innovation, 27 RAND J. ECON. 60, 61 (1996). 
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and in employee compensation.
62
  In practice, this is particularly important 
in hierarchically-modeled firms in which managers have access to all trade 
secrets at or below their managerial level.  When such a firm wishes to 
protect trade secrets at a given managerial level, all higher-level managers 
will also have access to it, and the firm must compensate them all enough to 
keep them from defecting to rival firms.
63
  As a result, such firms may find 
it more profitable to allow lower-level trade secrets to dissipate rather than 
pay to protect every last secret.
64
  Thus, managers will tend to increase their 
own wage value by overinvesting in the protection of those trade secrets to 
which they themselves have access and by overcompensating their 
subordinates to prevent defection.
65
  However, this overinvestment will 
come at the expense of higher direct cost to the firm in trade secret security 
as well as higher indirect cost to the firm in higher wages for superior 
managers, who face the same case with a wider array of the firm’s trade 
secrets.
66
 
As between an innovator firm and an imitator firm, the need and 
value of interfirm or public disclosure in order to exploit innovations are 
often at odds with the threat of imitation depending on the strength of 
available property rights in the innovation.
67
  Modeling this relationship as 
duopoly competition where the innovator firm has various kinds of private, 
asymmetric information about the innovation reveals an inverse relationship 
between the strength of available property rights and the resulting tendency 
toward disclosure.
68
  To wit, innovators tend to patent and fully disclose 
small innovations, to patent and only partially disclose larger innovations to 
manage imitation through licensing, and to rely primarily on secrecy for 
very large innovations.
69
 
Broadening this comparison of intellectual property protections, 
when private returns from innovation are the same whether patenting or 
maintaining trade secrecy, social returns are greater where the innovator 
chooses secrecy with licensing over disclosure by patenting.
70
  Because this 
effect results from the lack of an independent creation defense in patent 
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68
 Id. at 2–3. 
69
 Id. at 3. 
70
 Franco Cugno & Elisabetta Ottoz, Trade Secrets vs. Broad Patents: The Role of 
Licensing, 2 REV. L. & ECON. 209 (2006). 
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law,
71
 secrecy is not superior to regimes of intellectual property protection 
such as copyright, where such a defense does exist.
72
 
Summarizing this body of theoretical literature through a simple 
model illustrates a key objective of this article.  Suppose that a trade secret 
with some determinable value L is at risk of theft with some probability p.  
The probability p itself depends on the vigilance of the firm that owns the 
trade secret in protecting its trade secrets.  As the firm’s expenditure x on 
preventing trade secret loss grows, its probability p of suffering 
misappropriation declines.  Thus, p = p(x) and decreases monotonically.
73
  
Aside from the risk of misappropriation, the firm may also lose its trade 
secret through accidental disclosure or reverse engineering with some 
probability q and so incurs some expenditure y to prevent this form of loss.  
Thus, q = q(y) and also decreases monotonically.  The firm’s objective 
function is a minimand: to minimize the sum of (1) the expected loss due to 
trade secret dissipation, either by misappropriation or by accidental 
disclosure or reverse engineering, and (2) the cost of developing and 
implementing preventive procedures to protect trade secrets. 
If the firm is selling one unit of output at a given cost, which is 
independent of the costs of protecting trade secrets, then the total expected 
loss EL, with x and y within the control of the firm, is expressible by the 
following function: 
EL(x, y) = p(x)[1 – q(y)] + q(y)[1 – p(x)] + p(x)q(y)L + x + y 
The first-order conditions for minimizing this function with respect to x and 
y may be re-expressed as: 
L = –1 / [p’(1 – q)] 
and 
L = –1 / [q’(1 – p)] 
Both must both be positive.  Thus, the greater the value of trade secrecy and 
the more efficient the method of preventing trade secret loss, the greater the 
amount spent on protecting trade secrecy. 
Indeed, this article is partly an empirical exploration of the 
Friedman-Landes-Posner theoretical framework and subsequent 
refinements:  to put values to L and to determine the probability distribution 
and relative magnitudes of those values in accordance with the methods by 
which they are calculated.  In doing so, this article also takes note of 
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increasing dissatisfaction over the last decade in both academia and industry 
with patenting as a means for protecting intellectual property,
74
 and an 
increasing enthusiasm instead for using trade secrecy and related strategies, 
such as lead time advantage, be it to protect product innovations
75
 or to raise 
profits and stimulate clustering without inhibiting technological spillovers.
76
  
For data with which to conduct the empirical exploration, federal criminal 
prosecutions pursuant to the Economic Espionage Act of 1996
77
 (EEA) are 
a rich and largely untapped source of insight into trade secret valuation. 
C. The Economic Espionage Act of 1996 
The EEA was a legislative response to the perceived growing 
disparity between federal protections for disclosed inventions and creative 
works in the form of private civil causes of action in patent and copyright, 
as compared with the absence of federal protections for trade secrets.
78
  
Congress regarded the EEA to be all the more urgent because of the 
importance of “proprietary economic information” to the national security 
interests of the United States.
79
 
As a matter of definition, the EEA distinguishes between trade 
secret misappropriation in the more conventional sense (“theft for pecuniary 
                                                     
74
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gain”)80 and economic espionage (“theft for the benefit of a foreign 
entity”).81  Important to both, however, are three procedural safeguards.  
First is the availability of protective orders to safeguard the integrity of 
trade secrets during otherwise public prosecutions of their theft.
82
  Second is 
specific authority for the EEA to have extraterritorial reach,
83
 in contrast to 
the general principle that acts of Congress have force only within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
84
  Third is limited prosecutorial 
discretion in pursuing possible violations of the EEA.  Originally, this 
safeguard was quite limiting, as approval was initially necessary from 
senior officials in the DOJ with respect to both economic espionage and 
trade secret theft.  This requirement is now somewhat relaxed, and DOJ 
prosecutors have greater independence with respect to pursuing trade secret 
theft cases.
85
 
Beyond these important but ultimately straightforward parameters, 
the empirical valuation of the stolen trade secrets has since become central 
to enforcement of the EEA.  Valuation is the foremost inquiry, whether in 
selecting cases to prosecute,
86
 determining the length of sentence to impose, 
or establishing the magnitude of fine to assess.
87
  Yet neither the text nor the 
legislative history of the EEA directly discuss the complex issue of trade 
secret valuation, and during the EEA’s initial enforcement in the late 1990s, 
it was expected that the federal criminal justice system would look for 
valuation guidance in case law applying the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.
88
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Indeed, the House Judiciary Committee report on the EEA only briefly 
discussed that “the very conditions that make this proprietary information so 
much more valuable make it easier to steal,”89 and that, “[g]iven the 
increased use of electronic information systems, information can now be 
stolen without asportation and the original usually remains intact.”90  Yet, 
this well-theorized nonrival and variously nonexcludable nature of 
information
91—enabling, e.g., theft without asportation—drives not only 
value and theft risk in trade secrets, but also difficulty in valuation. 
Like the employer-employee cases discussed above,
92
 a recent case 
illustrates the large values at risk from trade secrecy theft, the gravity with 
which federal enforcement institutions treat such theft, and the variability of 
valuation even when culpability is clear and the economic loss thoroughly 
documented.  In June 2010, biotechnology research scientist Kexue Huang 
was indicted for misappropriating and transporting trade secrets to the 
People’s Republic of China while working for Dow AgroSciences LLC.93  
A separate indictment in 2011 additionally charged Mr. Huang with stealing 
a trade secret from Cargill Inc.
94
  On October 18, 2011, Dr. Huang pled 
guilty both to economic espionage against Dow AgroSciences and to trade 
secret theft against Cargill, admitting the estimated aggregate loss from his 
criminal conduct to be in the range of $7 million to AgroSciences and $20 
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million to Cargill, respectively.
95
  The court ultimately sentenced Mr. 
Huang to seven and a quarter years in prison.
96
  Importantly, the Huang 
prosecutions also reflect a more basic distributive problem in attempting to 
describe the more publicly protected value of trade secrets in the criminal 
context, in contrast with the corrective private remedy appropriate to the 
civil context.
97
 
Thus, although civil trade secret valuations still remain the polestar 
of guidance in valuation for criminal cases,
98
 it is of no small consequence 
that trade secret protection under the EEA has also benefited in recent years 
from broader debate about the proper scope of trade secrecy at the federal 
level.
99
  Moreover, greater study of intangible asset valuation in patents,
100
 
copyrights,
101
 and trademarks
102
 has produced a literature ready for similar 
study on trade secrets. 
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II. PROSECUTIONS UNDER THE EEA 
To that literature, this article makes three principal contributions.  
First, using an original dataset, we analyze the size distribution of the values 
of the EEA trade secrets.  Second, we examine evidence of statistical 
differences between estimates of trade secret values, using different 
valuation methods and arriving at surprising results about the commonality 
of intent in courts’ valuation methods.  Finally, we find statistically 
significant differences both between high and low estimates of trade secret 
value and between valuations argued during prosecution and those 
employed at sentencing. 
A. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
This study examines 95 EEA prosecutions involving 147 
defendants during the period of 1996–2008.  Data is from statements and 
releases that the DOJ has issued about prosecutions the Criminal Division 
has conducted, especially the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property 
Section of that division,
103
 and from the Public Access to Court Electronic 
Records (PACER) service.
104
  Once identified, EEA cases prosecuted under 
18 U.S.C. § 1832 were further analyzed using docket reports, viz., lists and 
summaries of judicial proceedings such as appearances and actions; 
underlying court documents regarding filing and termination dates, 
sentences, fines, and conviction; and journalistic accounts discussing 
qualitative details such as the victim’s relationship to the defendant, the 
alleged value of the stole trade secrets, and parallel civil actions.  Not least, 
academic publications also yielded information about particular cases in the 
context of the EEA.
105
  The quantitative and qualitative evidence gathered 
from this wide range of data sources enables a robust inferential discussion 
beyond the descriptive accounts published to date, and supports greater 
normative discussion of the use and theft of trade secrets and of relevant 
available policy levers. 
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B. Econometric Model 
The threshold econometric question of how trade secrets are likely 
distributed in their value looks to the observed values of stolen trade secrets 
that have come to light in EEA prosecutions.  The expected distribution is 
lognormal,
106
 owing to a combination of Gibrat’s Law of Proportional 
Effects
107
 and the Central Limit Theorem.
108
  The reason for this expectation 
is that, as applied to firms, Gibrat’s Law posits that the growth rates of 
firms are a random process and are independent of their initial size, e.g., as 
measured by assets.  That is, because firm size is distributed lognormally, 
the underlying growth process is proportionate. 
More formally, if size is measured by assets, then given an asset 
value At at time period t, the change in asset size over one time period is a 
random proportion of its size in the previous period: 
(1) At – At–1 = t At–1 
where  t has mean zero and is serially uncorrelated.  From this, it follows 
that the growth rate of At is expressible as: 
(2) (At – At–1) / At–1 = A / At–1 = t 
Taking the summation of both sides of equation (2) over a number of 
periods I shows that: 
(3) ∑(t=1 to  (A / At–1) = ∑(t=1 to  (t) 
Moreover, if one lets the finite change in assets A in the numerator of the 
left hand side of equation (3) tend toward the small differential dA, and 
therefore going to the integral from the sum, then in the limit, the following 
approximation holds: 
(4) ∑(t=1 to  (A / At–1) =  ∫(from A0 to A (dA / A) = ln A – ln A0 
which is equal to the right hand side: 
(5) ∑(t t) 
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Given initial asset value A0, equations (3), (4), and (5) are expressible as: 
(6) ln AI = ln A0 + 1 + 2 + … + I 
By the Central Limit Theorem, the right-hand side of equation (6) will, in 
the limit as I → ∞, be normally distributed.  Thus, the distribution at 
equilibrium of the logarithm of asset value ln A may be denoted as: 
(7) ln A ~ N(, 2) 
which is a normal distribution having mean  and variance 2.  By 
definition, if the natural logarithm of A is normally distributed, then A is 
lognormally distributed, denoted as: 
(8) A ~ ln(, 2) 
Thus, Gibrat’s Law of Proportional Effects results in a lognormal 
equilibrium distribution of assets. 
Moreover, applied to trade secrets, Gibrat’s Law implies that, for a firm 
whose trade secrets have an asset value of A in a given year, each trade 
secret asset generates, or can have imputed to it, an annual income Y for the 
firm.  If the annual rate of interest is r, then the following simple 
proportional relationship will hold: 
(9) Y = r × A 
This proportion reflects a premise that industry practice confirms: the 
designated value of a trade secret is often based on the income stream 
attributable to that trade secret. 
 
C. Valuation Models 
A review of trade secret valuation models reveals important 
considerations for their application.  Three major sets of models merit 
discussion: income models, cost models, and market models. 
1. Income Models 
The income models—unjust enrichment, lost profits, and 
reasonable royalty—base the valuation of the trade secret on cash flow 
analysis.  These models have theoretically robust foundations, and the 
discounted cash flow approach in particular is a standard tool in financial 
analysis.
109
  This standardization suggests that, not only are firms more 
likely to be familiar with income models of valuation and related methods, 
but also that they constitute a well-theorized and therefore potentially 
powerful legal tool for litigants and courts. 
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 See generally JAMES R. HITCHNER, FINANCIAL VALUATION: APPLICATIONS AND 
MODELS (2d ed., 2006). 
138 WHAT’S IT WORTH TO KEEP A SECRET? [Vol. 13 
 
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act itself supports the use of income 
models.  The model act states: 
Damages can include both the actual loss caused by misappropriation 
and the unjust enrichment caused by misappropriation that is not taken 
into account in computing actual loss.  In lieu of damages measured by 
any other methods, the damages caused by misappropriation may be 
measured by imposition of liability for a reasonable royalty for a 
misappropriator’s unauthorized disclosure or use of a trade secret.
110
 
The UTSA’s reference to “actual loss” suggests that valuation of the trade 
secret may properly include lost profits, actual damages, or both.  The use 
of the income models in UTSA cases also underscores the high analytical 
regard in which these models are held and implicitly connects the 
considerable case law surrounding the UTSA with broader questions of 
trade secret valuation. 
Particularly among the income models, the reasonable royalty 
model is appealing as it can be implemented regardless of the actions of the 
alleged misappropriator or thief.  Unlike the unjust enrichment and lost 
profits models, which both require actual unauthorized use of the trade 
secret, the reasonable royalty model is universally applicable.
111
 
Despite this high regard, useful grounding in the case law, and wide 
applicability, the EEA data show only one identified case involving the use 
of reasonable royalty.  Indeed, income models more generally were used in 
only one-third of all EEA cases studied.  Thus, in spite of its theoretical 
potential from an economic perspective, the method is not popular in 
practice.  Reasons for this relative disuse may range from pragmatic 
concerns about the relative economic incentives and payoffs associated with 
the reasonable royalty model (or income models more generally),
112
 to more 
foundational cultural differences between more theoretically oriented 
economic arguments and more pragmatically inclined legal institutional 
                                                     
110
 UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3, available at 
www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/trade%20secrets/utsa_final_85.pdf. 
111
 See Zwillinger & Genetski, supra note 87, at 342–46 (arguing for the use of the 
reasonable royalty model in EEA cases as being most in line with Sentencing 
Guidelines).  To wit, Zwillinger and Genetski argue that:  “When ascertainable, this 
[reasonable royalty] measure values stolen information at the moment and in the 
context of the misappropriation, and it takes into account, but does not exclusively 
rely upon, the defendant’s intention to exploit information.” 
112
 Cf., e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 
85 TEX. L. REV. 1991 (2007) (advancing both theoretical and empirical arguments 
in the patent context that the reasonable royalty model tends, at least in component 
industries, systematically to overcompensate patent owners for inventions that are 
part of larger products rather than compensate them in proportion to the incremental 
value of the patented invention). 
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actors
113—particularly as reasonable royalty calculations, unlike other 
models, rely entirely on a hypothetical agreement between a willing 
licensee and willing licensor, an exercise fraught with its own analytical 
challenges.
 114
 
2. Cost Models 
The cost models—research and development, replacement costs, 
and actual damages—are based on the idea that the trade secret is worth the 
amount that it cost its owner to develop or protect, or would cost to 
redevelop.  These models, too, are involved in approximately one-third of 
the EEA cases identified here for study.  Significantly, innovative firms are 
likely to keep good accounts of research and development costs, a tendency 
that makes the model appealing for its ease of application.
115
  In practice, 
however, research and development investment alone may not represent the 
empirical minimum value, as comparison of the cost models in EEA cases 
shows.
116
 
With regard to usage of the cost models, the actual damages 
approach was involved in five cases, representing 17% of the EEA cases 
with identified trade secret value estimates.  Despite the lack of theoretical 
robustness—e.g., damages associated with the misappropriation could, to 
varying degrees, be independent of the underlying value of the trade 
secret—calculation of actual damages presents a fairly straightforward legal 
matter.  The victim must merely present evidence of the direct costs 
resulting from the theft. 
                                                     
113
 See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A 
PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 13–24 (2001) (criticizing prevalent 
approaches to the economic analysis of tort law for inadequately representing the 
full complexity of that body of legal doctrine). 
114
 Cf., e.g., Elyse Dorsey & Matthew R. McGuire, How the Google Consent Order 
Alters the Process and Outcomes of Frand Bargaining, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
979, 983 (2013) (noting the importance of ex ante versus ex post perspectives on 
investing in a patented technology rather than a next-best alternative and the 
associated problems of switching costs, lock-in, and—in the undesirable case—
holdup by the patentee).  The problem can be even more challenging in the 
reputationally charged realm of enjoining copyright infringement.  See Jiarui Liu, 
Copyright Injunctions After Ebay: An Empirical Study, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
215, 264 (discussing doctrinal concerns peculiar to copyright). 
115
 See MARK A. GLICK, LARA A. REYMANN & RICHARD HOFFMAN, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY DAMAGES: GUIDELINES AND ANALYSIS 337 (2002) (arguing that “the 
owner’s investment in the trade secret can be used as a proxy for the trade secret’s 
minimum value”). 
116
 See infra Part 0 (discussing the lack of statistically significant difference among 
the average values generated by using cost models in the EEA cases identified for 
study). 
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3. Market Models 
Market models seek to define a fair market value of the trade secret.  
The Sentencing Guidelines favor the use of fair market value, when 
available: 
The fair market value of the property unlawfully taken or destroyed or, 
if the fair market value is impractical to determine or inadequately 
measures the harm, the cost to the victim of replacing that property.
117
 
However, the market models have generated the widest range of 
trade secret valuations of the three types of models.  This variation is likely 
due to the relative subjectivity in measuring fair market value as compared 
to other models.  The reported range actually represents a conservative 
estimate, as the removed outlier—$108 million in the Lucent case118—was 
calculated using fair market value approach.  The use of fair market value 
estimates is limited by the type of trade secret: that is to say, there may be a 
limited market for the trade secrets in question as they are often quite 
industry- or technology-specific.  Bid information, for example, has no 
legitimate fair market value, as no legal market exists for bid information.  
As a result, while the sentencing guidelines may call for the utilization of 
fair market value, its application is neither straightforward nor widespread. 
III. DISCUSSION 
From this framework, the estimated values of stolen trade secrets in 
EEA prosecutions are variously grouped by the valuation model used for 
estimation, as well as by low, high, and cross-reference estimates.  The low, 
or conservative, estimates receive greater emphasis in accordance with prior 
literature.
119
  Low and high estimates are deflation-adjusted to 2008 values. 
A. Estimates Across Valuation Models 
Analysis of the EEA data initially reveals apparent differences 
among trade secret value estimates produced by different valuation 
methods.  Table 1 presents cases according to the valuation method used, 
based on low estimates.  In cases where an estimate of the stolen trade 
secret was published, roughly two-thirds identified the estimation method 
that the court used.  As mentioned above, one observation was removed as a 
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 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES 332 
(4th ed. 2013), available at www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/. 
118
 See infra note 119 and accompanying text. 
119
 See, e.g., Carr & Gorman, supra note 105. 
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clear outlier—an estimate of $108 million for the Lucent source code 
derived using the market value method.
120
 
Similarly, comparing valuation methodologies against the resulting 
value estimates, using the low estimates, shows marked clustering of values 
at the lower end of the scale.  This is consistent with previous findings of 
lognormality in the distribution of estimated trade secret values, where the 
cases proportionally most prevalent are associated with very low value 
estimates. 
However, the distribution of these values across calculation 
methods does not, at least for the small sample of 21 observations, indicate 
systematic differences among value estimates produced by these valuation 
methods.
121
  This lack of observed differences in the observed means of the 
various models admits of two explanations. 
One explanation is that, while different valuation models do 
produce meaningfully different value estimates, the sample size of 21 
observations is too small to detect such differences.  However, the estimates 
generated here have relied on small sample distribution theory to mitigate 
this problem, suggesting an alternate explanation.  That is, no meaningful 
difference exists among the methodological premises of the various 
valuation models.  The diverse valuation methods are based on the same 
economic theory, and merely approach the goal from different directions.  
What is more, although different valuation methods may, in practice, 
produce somewhat different valuations for the same trade secret, no 
systematic difference need result across the methods themselves. 
Nevertheless, though trade secret value estimates may not vary 
significantly from one valuation model to another, comparison across high, 
low, and cross-reference estimates reveals a quite different story, one with 
                                                     
120
 United States v. ComTriad et al, No. 2:01-cr-00365 (D.N.J., filed May 31, 2001) 
(noting that, in the Lucent case, the source code technology that the defendants 
stole was generating on the order of $100 million in sales for Lucent in 2000.  This 
was deemed an outlier because it is five times the value of its closest neighbor and 
seven standard deviations from the mean). 
121
 Two tests confirm the absence of statistically significant differences among the 
various valuation methods.  First is the analysis of variance (ANOVA) test, which 
here yields the following diagnostics: F = 1.11, and prob value = 0.39, indicating 
lack of significance in the differences.  Second is the student’s t-test for differences 
between the means of various categories of valuation—i.e., grouping 
methodologies as income models, cost models, and market models—which here 
yields prob value = 0.80 for cost vs. income, prob value = 0.50 for cost vs. market, 
and prob value = 0.28 for cost vs. market, all indicating a lack of significance in the 
differences.  Notably, all of these tests were conducted using logarithmically 
transformed observations to take account of the known lognormality of the 
variables. 
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important normative implications for the protection of trade secrets under 
federal criminal law.  As a point of departure for these comparisons, it is 
helpful first to understand how trade secret values are statistically 
distributed. 
B. Distribution and Comparison of Trade Secret Values  
As shown in Figure 1, the majority (79 percent) of stolen trade 
secrets are worth less than $5 million.  The sample size for low value 
estimates is 29 observations; the mean of low estimates is $4.47 million, the 
standard deviation is $9.95 million, and the mode—i.e., the value for a 
maximum on the probability density—is much lower.  The distribution of 
Figure 1 strongly suggests lognormality and is defined only for positive 
values of the variate, is unimodal, and is strongly positively skewed, with a 
typical long tail stretching to positive infinity.  Lognormality at a larger 
sample would predict a smoother long right tail for the probability density.  
A formal test of lognormality appears in Figure 2, where all data points are 
within the 95 percent confidence interval and the corresponding linear 
function is fitted by maximum likelihood.
122
 
Similar results hold for the high estimates, as shown in Figure 3, 
where the mean value is $26.3 million, the standard deviation is $88.7 
million, and the modal value is again well below the mean.  Moreover, as 
shown in Figure 4, the high estimates all lie within the 95% confidence 
interval
123
 and thus reflect a lognormal distribution for the same reasons as 
the low estimates discussed in Figures 1 and 2. 
C. Differences in Estimation 
1. Low and High Estimates 
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 Further confirmation comes from the Anderson-Darling (AD) test for departures 
from normality.  See generally Michael A. Stephens, Tests Based on EDF Statistics, 
in RALPH B. D’AGOSTINO & MICHAEL A. STEPHENS, GOODNESS-OF-FIT 
TECHNIQUES (1986).  In general, the greater the AD statistic, the less the support for 
a hypothesis of lognormality.  Conversely, the larger the probability value, the less 
the ability of the test to reject a null hypothesis of lognormality.  The AD statistic in 
Figure 2 enables comparison between distributions where smaller values are 
preferred.  Here, the AD statistic for the lognormal distribution (AD = 0.6) is lowest 
as compared to several alternate distributions.  The probability value calculation, 
based on the AD statistic, gives p-value = 0.108.  As the null hypothesis is that the 
data reflect a lognormal distribution, and the p-value in this case is greater than 
0.05, the null hypothesis is not rejected with 95 percent confidence, and the 
distribution of low estimates in trade secret value is, indeed, lognormal. 
123
 The Anderson-Darling statistic (AD = 0.48) is even lower, with p-value = 0.221. 
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Because most trade secrets in the analysis have two estimated 
values—a low estimate and a high estimate—it is possible to test for a 
statistical difference between them using a paired t-test.  As shown in Table 
2, the sample size is restricted to those cases in which the high estimate is 
distinct from the low estimate.  Though this reduces the sample size to 16 
observations, the results agree with those of the unreduced sample.  Based 
on the previously determined lognormality of the sample, the test is run on 
the natural logarithms of the estimated values. 
Although the high and low estimates are correlated,
124
 the paired t-
test indicates that the means of the two samples are statistically different.
125
  
Economically, this difference is highly meaningful in that it reflects as 
much as a $39.6 million difference between high and low estimates, based 
on the untransformed values of the means.  A further non-parametric test, 
the Wilcoxon test, confirms on weaker assumptions that the statistical 
difference between the two samples is highly significant.
126
  Moreover, just 
as Figures 2 and 4 give strong evidence of lognormality in the distribution 
of trade secret value estimates, the probability plot of the relation between 
high and low estimates shown in Figure 5 both reaffirms the lognormality 
of value estimates generally and highlights the differences between the high 
and low estimates. 
The implications of this statistical difference between high and low 
estimates are far-reaching.  The alleged value of the stolen trade secrets 
affect—sometimes strongly—everything from the reporting of trade secret 
theft,
127
 to the decision to prosecute,
128
 to sentencing determinations.  
Substantial differences in estimated value for the same trade secret increases 
uncertainty for owners of trade secrets and support the problematic view 
that valuation is sensitive to the viewpoint, and interests, of the party 
offering the value estimate.  Given the high burden of proof in criminal 
prosecution, this presents a problem for achieving justice when sentencing 
trade secret misappropriators and thieves. 
                                                     
124
 The coefficient of correlation is 0.46, significant at 10 percent. 
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 The mean of ln(high) is 2.58 more than the mean of ln(low), significant at 1 
percent. 
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 The Wilcoxon test gives p-value = 0.00. 
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 Victims are required to estimate the value of the trade secret when reporting the 
theft.  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Reporting Intellectual Property Crime: A Guide 
for Victims of Counterfeiting, Copyright Infringement, and Theft of Trade Secrets, 
available at www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/AppC-ReportingGuide.pdf. 
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 Cf. Paul Shukovsky et al, The Terrorism Trade-Off, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 11, 2007, at A1, available at 2007 WLNR 6959916 
(discussing post-9/11 FBI fraud-enforcement as a policy of “triage” in which losses 
below $150,000 were unlikely to be investigated at all, and losses as high as 
$500,000 were “much less likely” than before September 11, 2001, to be 
investigated). 
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2. Cross-Reference Values 
Resolving this problem requires going beyond simple comparison 
of high and low estimates to estimate trade secret values in EEA cases.  The 
additional step is to apply a cross-referencing method that uses a 
combination of actual sentences and sentencing guidelines.
129
  Such 
guidelines associate the offense level with a corresponding loss figure.  
Starting with a base offense level of 6 points to reflect the DOJ 
recommendation,
130
 the figure is adjusted up by two levels for convictions 
that include economic espionage or crimes committed by defendants 
considered to be insiders of the company.
131
  Based on incarceration periods 
adduced from PACER docket reports and on the offense level, the 
corresponding magnitude Xref of trade secret loss may be estimated using 
the 2008 Sentencing Guidelines as follows. 
First, the incarceration period of the convicted defendant is cross-
referenced with the number of offense points given by the sentencing 
guidelines, as shown in the first column of Table 3.  Because the 
incarceration ranges overlap, using the midpoint of each range best 
approximates the defendant’s incarceration period.  Second, as Table 4 
shows, the offense level is calculated using information about the defendant 
from case documents and reports.  Third, the value derived from Table 4 is 
subtracted from that derived in Table 5.  The remainder is cross-referenced 
with the stolen trade secret values dictated by the Sentencing Guidelines, 
and the corresponding value, in the second column of Table 5, is Xref.
132
 
This method produces loss estimates for 41 cases.  The Xref values 
for these cases had a mean of $241,300 with a standard deviation of 
$579,700.  As shown in Figure 6, the mean value of Xref is much lower than 
is the mean for either the high or low estimates of trade secret value that 
was previously discussed. The mode is much lower than that of the high or 
low estimates.  Moreover, though Figure 6 suggests a lognormal 
distribution, statistical analysis fails to confirm this conclusion.
133
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 See Zwillinger & Genetski, supra note 87, at 324 (arguing generally that “the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines’ (Guidelines) reliance on fair market value as 
the linchpin of criminal culpability can be incomplete in certain EEA cases, and a 
holistic sentencing approach allowing for the consideration of additional factors 
would provide a more just result”). 
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 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 117, at § IV.F (discussing penalties for 
the theft of commercial trade secrets prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–1839). 
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 See Zwillinger & Genetski, supra note 87, at 326–28 (discussing the application 
to EEA cases of sentencing guidelines). 
132
 This method is, of course, the reverse of how courts actually sentence, first 
calculating offense points and then deriving the incarceration period. 
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 A comparison of four different probability distributions—Weibull, lognormal, 
normal, and log-logistic—appears prima facie to favor a log-logistic distribution 
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That the Xref values do not follow the same distribution as the high 
and low values suggests that the Xref values fundamentally differ from the 
other two valuations.  Indeed, as Tables 6 and 7 show, the trade secret loss 
estimates used in sentencing (Xref) are lower, to a statistically significant 
degree, than both high and low estimates.  Moreover, as the distribution of 
Xref does not take a lognormal distribution, neither does ln(Xref) take a 
normal distribution.  Accordingly, a paired t-test is inapt to test for 
differences between Xref and other valuations. 
Better suited is the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test, 
which does not require normality in the underlying distributions.  The 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test compares the difference between the values of 
each pair, sorts all nonzero absolute differences into ascending order to 
assign ranks, and calculates the test statistic from the sum of the ranks for 
positive and negative differences.
134
 
Tables 6 and 7 compare high and low estimates, respectively, to the 
cross-reference estimate Xref.  The mean of Xref values is significantly lower 
than that of high estimate values
135
 and lower even than that of low estimate 
values.
136
 
These differences further indicate that courts are using considerably 
lower cross-reference values than even the low estimates generated by 
various valuation models.  The difference in raw means between cross-
reference and low estimates is as much as $6.45 million.  Accordingly, the 
values used in sentencing are lower, to a statistically significant degree, than 
those argued in the course of the court case.  Put another way, the basis for 
punishment is lower than the basis for the crime as prosecuted. 
                                                                                                                       
over the lognormal distribution: the lognormal distribution has an AD statistic of 
2.04, whereas the log-logistic has an AD statistic of 2.10.  However, the test 
statistics for these distributions results in a rejection of the null hypotheses (of 
lognormal or log-logistic distribution) with a p-value of 0.01 in both cases.  
Therefore, the data do not conform to any of these classical probability 
distributions. 
134
 The test statistic is as follows: 
Z = [ min(Sp, Sn) – (n(n+1) / 4) ] / √[ n(n+1)(2n+1) / 24 – ∑(j=1 to l) (tj
3
 – tj) / 48), 
where 
n = number of cases with non-zero differences; 
l = number of ties; 
tj = number of ties; 
Sp = sum of positive ranks; and 
Sn = sum of negative ranks 
135
 The Wilcoxon test statistic Z = –3.44, and prob value = 0.001. 
136
 The Wilcoxon test statistic Z = –2.80, and prob value = 0.005. 
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D. Implications of Valuation Differences 
The statistically significant difference between high and low 
estimates and their own disconnection from the cross-reference values that 
courts use—all for the same trade secret—is cause for concern with respect 
to the impact of the economic policy animating criminal trade secret 
protection in the United States. 
In particular, because the analysis in an EEA case of the magnitude 
of loss resulting from trade secret misappropriation largely determines 
sentencing—including whether the defendant will be imprisoned—even 
slight variations in the estimated loss can be quite meaningful.
137
  The 
evidence discussed here demonstrates that empirically observed sentences 
of incarceration may be lower because courts have chosen to apply trade 
secret valuations that are particularly conservative. 
This may reflect systematically successful arguments by defendants 
for the application of the lower values, particularly given the postures of 
prosecutor and defendant on opposing ends of the bargaining relationship 
and the statistically lower values used in sentencing guidelines.  It may also 
reflect judicial modesty in appreciation of the difficulties facing the 
valuation of trade secrets and a consequent conservatism in favoring lower 
value estimates.  Indeed, an examination of three case studies revealed that 
“the department essentially went in the tank on two of them and just said, 
‘We cannot value [the trade secret],’ and [defendants] got probation.”138 
Moreover, in addition to the complexity of valuation methods, the 
goal of the values used in sentencing (i.e., Xref values) is not solely that of 
determining a fair market value: 
The purpose of the Guidelines is to achieve sentences that accurately 
reflect the culpability of offenders in a consistent, uniform and 
proportional manner.  In attempting to adhere to both the letter and 
purpose of the Guidelines, sentencing courts often struggle to make a 
fair market value determination. . . .  In EEA cases, where the actual or 
intended loss to the victim or gain to the defendant can be 
disproportionate to the market value of the trade secrets, use of the 
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 Zwillinger & Genetski, supra note 87, at 341. 
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 UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, Symposium on Federal Sentencing 
Policy for Economic Crimes and New Technology Offenses, Session on Economic 
Espionage, at 276 (Oct. 13, 2000) (transcript of discussion by David Green, Joseph 
F. Savage, Jr. & Carla Mulhern), available at www.ussc.gov/Research_and_ 
Statistics/Research_Projects/Economic_Crimes/20001012_Symposium/uGroupThr
eeDayTwo.PDF. 
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market value determination alone will not always produce a sentence 
that is just.
139
 
Indeed, the discrepancy between the values argued in the course of 
the case and those used in sentencing reflects a recognition by the court that 
these values may overestimate the actual or intended loss or gain.  Thus, the 
criminal context of the EEA may play a large role in accounting for the 
statistically significant differences between these values. 
Nonetheless, while the evidence indicates a favorable environment 
for would-be trade secret misappropriators and thieves, it lowers the 
incentives to innovate.  Given the wide variability of the valuation methods 
and the evident use of lower value estimates in practice, the trade secret 
owner faces increased uncertainty as to the strength of the protection 
provided by trade secrets. 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, trade secret misappropriation and theft currently face 
diminished disincentives, and trade secret owners confront the uncertainty 
of diverse value estimates and, indeed, diverse methodologies of valuation.  
This uncertainty, particularly as it drives enforcement, therefore reduces the 
practical worth of trade secrets to owners, as a weakly protected trade secret 
has lower expected value to its owner.  While infringement and damages 
payments may be beneficial for the patent owner, such benefit presupposes 
a patent-protected research tool.
140
  Because trade secrets by definition 
derive value from their secrecy, the weaker the protection of this value, the 
lower the appropriable rewards to innovation.
141
  Thus, greater uncertainty 
associated with the protection of trade secrets lowers incentives to innovate 
where trade secrecy is a meaningful mechanism for appropriating value 
from innovation. 
The EEA sought to increase the overall protection for trade secrets, 
to unify the legal status at the federal level, and to provide protection 
against foreign economic espionage.  Notwithstanding concerns articulated 
in the legal literature that the EEA may go too far in increasing the strength 
and definition of trade secrets,
142
 empirical evidence regarding calculations 
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 Zwillinger & Genetski, supra note 87, at 353. 
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 See, e.g., Mark Schankerman & Suzanne Scotchmer, Damages and Injunctions 
in Protecting Intellectual Property, 32 RAND J. ECON. 199 (2001). 
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 Cf. Alan C. Marco & Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Certain Patents, 16 YALE J.L. & 
TECH. 103 (discussing the economic importance in patent law of reliable 
mechanisms for rights enforcement to the practical value of the patent right, and 
empirically characterizing this relationship by estimating cumulative abnormal 
returns in stock market reactions to patent litigation decisions in the federal courts). 
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 See, e.g., Carr et al, supra note 105.  
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of damages in EEA cases suggests that the EEA is not being used to its full 
capacity.  Indeed, this evidence is consistent with affirmative steps that even 
the generally contentious 112th Congress took to strengthen the use of 
federal criminal trade secret protections, first by broadening the 
jurisdictional element of the EEA through the Theft of Trade Secrets 
Clarification Act of 2012,
143
 and again by increasing the maximum fines 
permitted under the EEA through the Foreign and Economic Espionage 
Penalty Enhancement Act of 2012.
144
 
To the intellectual property rights literature of industrial 
organization, this article contributes a publicly developed database that is 
well suited to examining the values of trade secrets from the perspective of 
diverse calculation methods.  Parametric comparisons reveal that estimates 
of trade secret value do not vary significantly across valuation methods for 
the same trade secret.  High and low estimates of trade secret value are 
lognormally distributed, as predicted by Gibrat’s Law, and are statistically 
significantly different.  By contrast, cross-reference estimates of trade secret 
valuations are distributed neither lognormally nor according to any classical 
probability density, and differ statistically from high and low estimates 
alike. 
More generally, we conclude that the value that trade secrets create 
reflects an important economic role for trade secrecy in the larger sphere of 
intellectual property protection.  The current body of trade secret literature, 
both theoretical and empirical, proceeds largely by reference to a more 
robust and faster-growing body of patent literature.  A review of the 
methods used to assess damages in trade secret cases under the EEA 
confirms that the methods themselves rely heavily on analytical and 
empirical development in patent cases.  However, their application to trade 
secret cases is complicated by the secret nature and legal ambiguity of trade 
secrecy as compared with the disclosure-oriented body of patent law. 
As to further study, data on EEA prosecutions provides a unique 
opportunity for continuing empirical analysis of the use of trade secrets, 
their value, and the nature and consequences of their misappropriation.  The 
possibility of biases in the selection of cases for prosecution represents a 
potentially valuable thread of research.  Also potentially fruitful is an 
extension of the patent damages models used in trade secret valuation 
analysis, particularly if such an extension contributes to the development of 
new valuation models specific to trade secrets while taking account of the 
doctrinal and enforcement concerns that are peculiar to trade secrecy. 
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 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
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 Pub. L. No. 112–269 (Jan. 14, 2013). 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1: The Estimated Value of Trade Secrets by Valuation Method 
Low Estimates of Trade Secret Value Using Various Methods 
EEA Cases 1996–2008 
 Method Mean Std. Dev. No. of Cases 
(i) Unjust 
Enrichment 
$   5,728,000  $   6,422,000  4 
(ii) Lost Profits $      708,000  $      411,000  2 
(iii) Reasonable 
Royalty 
$   1,000,000  — 1 
(iv) R&D $ 10,968,000  $ 18,950,000  4 
(v) Actual 
Damages 
$      207,000  $      390,000  5 
(vi) Market Value $ 10,145,000  $ 13,832,000  5 (1 outlier 
removed) 
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Figure 1.  Probability Density of Trade Secret Value, Low Estimates 
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Figure 2.  Confidence Intervals, Lognormally Distributed Low Estimates 
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Figure 3.  Probability Density of Trade Secret Value, High Estimates 
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Figure 4.  Confidence Intervals, Lognormally Distributed High Estimates 
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Table 2: Paired T-Test for Difference between Low and High Estimates 
Paired Sample Statistics 
 Mean N Std. Dev.   
ln (Low) 12.33 16 2.04   
ln (High) 14.91 16 2.73   
Paired Sample Correlations 
 N Correlation Sig.   
ln (Low) 
& ln 
(High) 
16 0.46 0.07   
Paired Samples Test 
Paired Differences 
ln (Low) 
–ln 
(High) 
 95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
  
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Lower Upper df Sig. (2-
tailed) 
-2.58 2.54 -3.93 -1.22 15 0.001 
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Figure 5: Probability Plot, High and Low Estimates 
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Table 3: Incarceration and Corresponding Offence Points 
 Range of Months of Incarceration 
Offence Points Incarceration 
Minimum 
Incarceration 
Maximum 
 8  0 6 
 9  4 10 
… … … 
 14  15 21 
 15  18 24 
 16  21 27 
… … … 
 42  360 Life 
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Table 4: Calculation of Base Offence Level 
Base Offence Points Adjustment 
6 Base Offence level according to DOJ Manual 
+2 Assumed for all defendants (for more than 
minimal planning (according to Zwillinger et 
al)) 
–2 Assumed for all defendants (for acceptance of 
responsibility (according to Zwillinger et al)) 
6 Subtotal 
+2 If Charged with 1831 (economic espionage, 
which has a higher offence level) 
+2 If considered “insider” (also a higher offence 
level) 
 Total, then cross-referenced with Sentencing 
Guidelines 
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Table 5: Offence Points Based on Value of Stolen Trade Secret 
Points Value of Stolen Trade Secrets 
0 $            5,000 
2 $            5,000 
4 $          10,000 
6 $          30,000 
8 $          70,000 
… … 
30 $ 400,000,000 
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Figure 6.  Distribution of Xref Values 
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Table 6: Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Comparison, Cross-Reference and 
High
145
 
Ranks 
   n Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks 
Xref – High  Negative 
Ranks 
Xref < High 19 10.37 197 
 Positive 
Ranks 
Xref  > High 1 13 13 
 Ties Xref  = High 0   
 Total  20   
Test Statistics 
 Z Asymp. Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
   
Xref  – 
High 
-3.435 0.001    
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 For this table and the next, the asymptotic significance for the Z-stat is two 
tailed. 
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Table 7: Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Comparison, Cross-Reference and Low 
Ranks 
   n Mean 
Rank 
Sum of 
Ranks 
Xref  – 
Low  
Negative 
Ranks 
Xref  < Low 16 11.25 180 
 Positive 
Ranks 
Xref  > Low 4 7.50 30 
 Ties Xref  = Low 0   
 Total  20   
Test Statistics 
 Z Asymp. Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
   
Xref  – 
Low 
-2.800 0.005    
 
 
